Socrates and Akrasia

Most of us think that it is possible for someone to know what the right or good thing to do is and yet fail to do it. Indeed, most of think that we actually find ourselves in that situation fairly often. I know that I should be grading and yet.... I know that I should not lie and yet.... This seemingly common phenomena is called weakness of the will or akrasia. But Socrates denies this (or seems to). According to Socrates it is not possible for someone to know what the right or good thing to do is and fail to do it. If S fails to do the right or good thing, then S does not (or did not) know what the right or good thing is (or was). In other words, Socrates denies akrasia or weakness of the will. Instead, Socrates defends the following:
If S knows the good, then S does the good
Or, put differently,
If S knows that doing A is the good/right thing to do, then S does A
Or, put differently,
S never knowingly does what S judges to be bad/wrong
Soc's Defense
Since Socrates' position is the shocking one, he needs to defend it. And he does. He attempts to provide a different analysis of what is actually going on when we appear to do something that is contrary to our judgment of what we ought to be doing. 
When I do something that is contrary to what I said is the right or good thing what is going on?
The common and seemingly highly plausible response is that I was overcome by pleasure (or avoidance of pain). In other words, while I know that lying is wrong, my lying at this time in this place was due to some pleasure that seemed to me to require lying (or avoiding some pain that seemed to me to require lying). So, I lied in order to secure some pleasure (or avoid some pain). Thus, I did what I know to be wrong because I was overcome by my desire for pleasure (or avoidance of pain). But, according to Socrates, this common explanation does not actually support akrasia (weakness of the will).  
Here is one of my reformulations of Socrates' argument:

  1. Some pleasurable things are bad because they lead to pain
  2. The badness of these pleasurable things is their resulting in pain and depriving of pleasure
  3. Some painful things are good because they lead to pleasure
  4. The goodness of these painful things is their resulting in pleasure and depriving of pain.
  5. So, pleasure is good and pain is bad
  6. S does a bad thing knowing that it is bad because S is overwhelmed by pleasure.
  7. 6 implies that S does a painful thing knowing that it is painful because S is overwhelmed by pleasure.
  8. 7 is absurd. 
So, by being overcome by pleasure to do something bad, I am not actually knowingly doing something bad. Instead I am knowingly doing something good that results in something bad. But the pleasure I seek is, considered by itself, good, since pleasure, considered by itself, is good. 

Thoughts?

Comments

  1. Peyton PitmanSeptember 9, 2019 at 8:35 AM

    Since Socrates argues that nobody would knowingly do anything bad, how would this example fall into that?
    1. I posses the knowledge that hitting is bad.
    2. I am with a group of friends, and we are in a situation where they pressure me into hitting someone.
    3. I know that hitting them is wrong; I do not get pleasure from hitting them.
    4. However, I hit them anyways because of peer pressure.
    5. Therefore, I knowingly did something bad.

    How does that fall into the argument against akrasia?
    - Peyton

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. KristenSeptember 9, 2019 at 11:12 AM

      Would this have to do with the avoidance of pain? So you think there will be more pain and less pleasure from not falling into peer pressure. Since there is less pain in hitting the person, then the lack of pain has an increase in pleasure?
      And this makes me think... What if there are only two options, and you know both are bad (like in this example) or something more obvious. The Nazis come up to your house and ask if there are any Jews. Saying yes would be sentencing those people to pain, but saying no is lying. You know both are wrong... So is choosing the one that seems the least wrong similar to choosing what is good? Even if you knew it was bad?

      Delete
    2. Peyton PitmanSeptember 9, 2019 at 11:34 AM

      I think for the nazi example, the decision you ultimately go with would still be the "good" choice. Think of it like this: Although you know that both decisions are bad (lying/sentencing Jewish people to pain), you are still going to choose the option that is "good" within the circumstances or your own beliefs. For example, if you choose to lie, you may know that lying is bad, but you're only lying because you believe that the goodness of saving the Jewish people is ultimately better than lying. That's what I'm thinking.

      Delete

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