Phaedo: One Argument, Objections, and Replies

The Phaedo is jam packed with arguments, objections, and replies. The most interesting exchange, according to me, is near the end after Socrates has given what is called his Affinity Argument. Here is my version of his argument 

Post-existence of the soul: Affinity Argument
1.    Things that change and are composite are the particulars (the physical/material stuff).  
2.    The forms are unchanging and simple (by definition).
3.    The things that change and are composite are perceived with the body.  
4.    The things that are unchanging and simple are perceived with the soul.  
5.    The body is like the things it perceives—changing and composite. 
6.    The soul is like the things it perceives—unchanging and simple.  
7.    The forms cannot be destroyed.  
8.    Hence, the soul probably cannot be destroyed.

The Affinity Argument is an argument from analogy. Socrates is pointing out some similarities between the soul and the forms and then drawing a conclusion based on those similarities. Simmias and Cebes are going to exploit the analogy and attempt to point out some dissimilarities and thus reduce the force of the argument. 

Simmias’s Objection: Simmias suggests that the theory of recollection shows that the soul preexists the body but it does not show that the soul outlives the body.  Simmias suggests that the soul is like the harmony that exists between the parts of an instrument.  It attunes the body but it is destroyed when the body is—just as harmony is destroyed when the instrument is.

Soc’s Reply: Simmias’ analogy fails 
1.    If recollection then we preexist our bodies.  
2.    But harmony does not preexist the instrument.  
3.    So, if our souls are like harmony then recollection is false.  
4.    But Simmias agrees with the theory of recollection.  
5.    Hence soul is not like harmony.  

More differences between harmony and soul: 
-harmony cannot direct instrument/but soul can direct the body; harmony comes in degrees/soul does not; 
-just souls are in harmony-unjust souls are not, but if soul is harmony, then just soul is a harmony of a harmony—this is incoherent (see Republic). 

Cebes’s Objection: Cebes suggests that the soul’s outliving the body has not been proved and he offers the following: 
From the fact that the soul is more divine than the body (from its ability to perceive the forms) it does not follow that the soul outlasts all bodies. A man outlasts some of his clothes, but not all of them—not the last clothes he had on when he died. Similarly, a soul may outlast some bodies but perhaps it does not outlast the last body it has before it dies. 

Soc’s Reply: If you grant that the forms exist, then the soul is immortal.  

1. If x has as an essential property F, and F is such that it cannot become non-F, then x is such that it cannot become non-F.  
2. Souls have as an essential property being alive.
3. The property being alive is such that it cannot become non-alive.
3. Hence, souls cannot become non-alive.

Objection: Soc seems to be assuming something like the following: the soul must be either F or non-F.  Since the soul cannot be non-alive (non-F), then the soul must be alive (F).  But this begs the question.  It assumes that the soul always exists.  For the soul to be the bearer of the property F or non-F, the soul must exist.  Hence, if the soul must be either F or non-F, the soul must exist.  So either way the soul exists eternally.  

I think the problem is with the first premise of the argument (of the argument just above).  There is an ambiguity in the second clause of the antecedent (‘and F is such that it cannot become non-F’), which recurs in the consequent (‘then x is such that it cannot become non-F’).

Ambiguity Disambiguated:
F is such that it cannot become non-F

            First reading: F is such that, while it exists, it cannot be non-F.
            Second reading: F is such that, even if it ceases to exist, F cannot be non-F.

The first reading is clearly true but does not help Socrates. The second reading is not true.  If F ceases to be, then there is nothing that can be attributed to it directly. That is, if something goes completely out of existence, then it cannot be the bearer of any properties at all.  

            Third reading: F is such that, F cannot be non-F, and F never ceases to exist. 

The third reading will get Socrates what he wants but it begs the question.  It assumes precisely what is at issue, namely, the soul never ceases to exist.  


These issues can be repeated, with slight modification, for the consequent of the first premise. 

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