Plato-Protagoras

Here are some of the arguments that show up in the Protagoras

Craft Expert Principle: If S studies some craft C with an expert at C, then S is likely to get better at C.

Both Soc and Pro seem to endorse the above principle. Think of examples. 
Pro claims to be an expert at politics or living well.  Thus, Pro can make his students into good citizens/humans.

We can think of the dialogue as centering around two related questions:
           -Socrates is obsessed with discovering what constitutes the good human life. 
-Since Protagoras claims to be a teacher of virtue, and since virtues are good-making features of whatever has them, Pro is claiming to be able to make his students into good humans. Soc is attempting to discover is that really is true.

According to Soc, the following two claims appear to be inconsistent:

  1. Everyone can advise on political affairs or things having to do with virtue
  2. Virtue can be taught

Soc’s First Argument
  1. Teachable things normally have recognized experts 
  2. The opinion of recognized experts on something is more valuable than the opinions on non-experts on that thing.
  3. Everyone is permitted and encouraged to share their opinion on political matters—things dealing with living well or the good life or civic and domestic virtue.
  4. Hence, there are no experts on virtue
  5. Hence, virtue is not teachable.
What do you think of this argument? Are there steps that are missing? How does Pro respond?
Soc’s Second Argument
  1. If virtue is teachable, then students of experts in virtue should become better (Craft Expert Principle).
  2. But the children of the best Athenians are often not good citizens.
  3. Hence, virtue is not teachable.
What do you think of this argument? How does Pro respond?
Pro has some interesting reponses to Soc’s arguments. But is Pro really an expert about virtue?
Soc Against Pro’s Expertise
  1. Piety and justice are virtues.
  2. Hence, according to Pro piety and justice are dissimilar—different powers and different functions 
  3. But being just is pious and being pious is just.
  4. Hence, either piety is justice or S is pious if, and only if S is just 
  5. Hence, piety and just are not dissimilar
What do you think of this argument? How does Pro respond?
Soc’s argument from opposites
In the section that was left out of the reading I gave you, Soc presents the following inconsistent set of propositions to Pro daring Pro to figure out which one he needs to give up:
  1. If x can have an opposite, then x has at most one opposite
  2. Folly can have an opposite
  3. Wisdom is the opposite of Folly
  4. Temperance is the opposite of Folly
  5. Wisdom and temperance are dissimilar
Which proposition should Pro give up? Which one would you give up?




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